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Social marketing is becoming increasingly important in contemporary business. Central to social marketing
is quantifying how consumers choose between alternatives and how they influence each other. This work
considers a new but simple multinomial choice model for multiple agents connected in a recommendation
network based on the explicit modeling of choice adoption behavior. Efficiently computable closed-form
solutions, absent from analyses of threshold/cascade models, are obtained together with insights on how the
network affects aggregate decision making. In particular, a new measure of the overall decision making power
of individual agents, “decision share”, is proposed. A stylized “brand ambassador” selection problem is posed
to model targeting in social marketing. Therein, it is shown that a greedy selection strategy leads to solutions
achieving at least 1− 1/e of the optimal value. In an extended example of imposing exogenous controls,
a pricing problem is considered wherein it is shown that the single player profit optimization problem is
concave, implying the existence of pure strategy equilibria for the associated pricing game.
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1. Introduction
People seldom make choices in isolation. Not only are they influenced by the recommendations of
prominent public figures (Chung et al. 2013, Grover and Fixmer 2011), people are also influenced
by family, friends and others in the communities or interest groups they belong to.
While businesses have long been aware of both recommendation effects, celebrity endorsements
have historically been the most prominent mode of recommendation-based persuasion. Over the
past decade, however, improvements in communications technology and increased access to that
technology have greatly facilitated the business use of peer-to-peer recommendation systems to
drive sales. Numerous web-based communities have emerged, allowing consumers to share their
views and experiences on products/services, and engage in discussion on those views.
1
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A growing body of evidence, much drawn from the aforementioned web-based communities,
strongly suggests that consumers are highly responsive to recommendations from people within
their social circles (see, for instance, Keller and Barry 2003, Smith et al. 2005, Bart et al. 2005,
Bell and Song 2007, Iyengar et al. 2009, 2011, Racherla and Friske 2012, eMarketer 2014). As such
firms have been increasingly seeking to co-opt consumers as product evangelists.
Even in retail, social marketing is gaining prominence. Apple and many other large firms use
the “Net Promoter System” (Bain & Company 2013) where responses to questions like “how likely
would you be to recommend...” are aggregated to give an estimate of the difference between the
percentage of “promoters” and the percentage of “detractors”.
Internet social networks have stepped up to monetize the online social interaction that they
mediate. For instance, the advertising system of Facebook, the largest social networking site of
the Western world, is premised on making (targeted) advertisements more compelling through
endorsements (“likes”) by friends. As a testament to advertisers’ increased focus on social marketing
and their buy-in to the logic of Facebook’s advertising scheme, in 2011, Facebook was already
serving up about $1.58 billion worth of Internet display advertisements in the United States ($3.15
billion worldwide). This figure rose to $2.07 billon ($4.28 billion worldwide) in 2012 and $3.17
billion ($6.99 billion worldwide) in 2013.
This work is premised on the proposition that choice is not only driven by personal preferences
and expertise, but also by the recommendations and choices of others. Here, how multiple agents,
connected in a recommendation network, choose between alternatives is studied. Here, agents face
the same finite set of alternative choices and possess idiosyncratic inclinations towards those choices.
However, as they simultaneously influence and are influenced by each other, the actual choices they
make typically would differ from what would be suggested purely based on those inclinations.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
(i) This work presents a simple choice model that explicitly models the key feature of recom-
mendation networks: the agents’ option to adopt other agents’ choices.
(ii) Analytical solutions are readily obtained from the model, providing insights on how a recom-
mendation network affects choice. This characteristic has not been demonstrated in existing
threshold/cascade models (wherein simulation is generally required to compute solutions).
(iii) Complementing the usual “market share” (“choice share” here) quantifications, a natural
measure of the influence of each agent (“decision share”) is developed. This measure also
turns out to be the key to the natural generalization beyond finite choice sets.
(iv) The “brand ambassador” selection problem is presented to model targeting in social market-
ing. Though it is NP-hard, (1− 1/e)-optimal solutions can be efficiently computed.
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1.1. Relationship With Existing Work
A number of authors have studied choice models where membership in social groups affects out-
comes. Notable examples are the work of Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and De Giorgi et al. (2010),
who studied model identification in a setting where decisions of agents (activity levels and binary
choice respectively) are affine in the “average behavior” of the agents’ social groups (“linear in
means”); Brock and Durlauf (2001) who considered (binary) random utility maximization models
where agents’ utilities are affine in the “average group behavior”; and Brock and Durlauf (2002)
who extended the aforementioned binary model to a multinomial choice model wherein the utility
accruing to an agent for selecting a given choice is affine in the average choice probability for that
choice. Unfortunately, as Blume et al. (2010) note in their survey article, there exists little work
on multinomial choice models with social interactions. Furthermore, closed form solutions are gen-
erally not available even for binomial choice models. In this work, a new multinomial choice model
that models the effects of a recommendation network is introduced. The model is a variant of
the “linear in means” model but generates (closed form) choice probabilities rather than “activity
levels”. As a bonus, the model is readily generalizable to infinite choice sets.
Also relevant to this work is the research program on learning in networks. The primary project
within this domain of inquiry is the characterization of when beliefs do or do not converge to (the
relevant representation of) true state of the world. The literature on learning in networks may be
loosely classified into two sub-schools: Bayesian learning (e.g.: Acemoglu et al. 2011), and “linear”
learning (e.g.: DeGroot 1974, Acemoglu et al. 2010, 2013). In this paper, a close connection will
be drawn between this work and a general model of “linear” learning.
Viewed from the angle of social media marketing, this work has links to the literature on the
propagation of information/influence on a network. The influence maximization problem was first
proposed and studied by Domingos and Richardson (2001). In that work, they proposed a gen-
eral descriptive model of influence propagation based on a Markov random field, but proposed
only simple local search heuristics for solving the influence maximization problem. Shortly after,
Kempe et al. (2003, 2005) considered two families of models of influence propagation, “cascade”
models and “threshold” models, and applied them to influence maximization. By demonstrating
that the expected number of “active nodes” on termination of a given influence propagation process
is monotone and submodular in the initial subset of “active nodes”, they obtained (1− 1/e− ǫ)-
optimal (ǫ arbitrarily small, according to the fidelity of the simulation used) performance guarantees
for greedy selection strategies in the influence maximization problem under the given influence
propagation process. Notably, the natural “cascade” process generating the same “choice shares”
as the model to be presented does not satisfy the assumptions of the “decreasing cascade model”,
the most general cascade model analyzed in Kempe et al. (2005) (see §3.4).
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Distinct from previous work, underpinning the model is an implicit extension of the choice set
from the base set of alternatives to include the adoption of other agents’ choices, underscoring
the fact that adopting the choice of a particular agent is itself a distinct choice and reflecting
a key aspect of recommendation networks. Closed form choice probabilities may be obtained in
a computational tractable manner, making the model practical for large-scale social marketing
applications. Like Kempe et al. (2003, 2005), (1−1/e)-optimal solutions to the “brand ambassador”
selection problem may be obtained via the route of monotonicity and submodularity, arguably
fundamental characteristics of the diffusion of information on a network.
2. Networks and Choice Modeling: Fundamentals
A discrete choice model is a (stochastic) decision model wherein agents are modeled as using some
given decision processes, such as solving optimization problems, to arrive at their choices. However,
due to imperfect knowledge on the part of the modeler, there is uncertainty (e.g.: parametric) about
the agents’ decision processes, and thus the choices that will be made. As such, choice models return
not a single choice for each agent, but a probability distribution over the set of alternatives. The
most commonly used framework, random utility models, has agents maximizing over a (finite) set
of random utility functions, encompassing models like the logit, probit and mixed logit. (See Train
(2009) for an introduction, and see Natarajan et al. (2009) for an interesting connection to discrete
optimization under uncertainty.) More broadly, discrete choice models feature stochastic decision
dynamics being modeled at varying levels of detail. For example, Blanchet et al. (2013) introduce
structure by modeling substitution between choices as state transitions of a Markov chain; and at
a distant extreme, Farias et al. (2013) completely eschew modeling decision dynamics in favor of
estimating distributions over all possible preference orders.
In this paper, a choice model is presented based on a simple probabilistic decision process: agents
probabilistically make choices based on their own preferences or adopt the choices of another agent.
Prior to describing the model, it would be useful to first define the nomenclature:
• A: The (finite) set of agents.
• C: The (finite) set of choices.
• pik ∈ [0,1]: Probability that agent i∈A will adopt the choice of agent k ∈A.
• P : A matrix of dimension |A| × |A| with (i, k) entry pik.
• qij ∈ [0,1]: Probability that agent i∈A will select choice j ∈C without consulting the network.
• q(j): A vector of dimension |A| with i-th entry qij.
• πij: Probability that agent i ∈A will pick choice j ∈C.
Presently, the pik’s and the qij’s are defined as constant parameters. However, P and {q
(j)}j∈C will
be allowed to vary in the “brand ambassador” selection problem of §4.1 and in the pricing problem
of §4.2. Subsequently, let ei be the i-th unit vector and let e be the vector of all ones.
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Though the estimation of model parameters is important, the focus of this work is modeling
rather than inference. Furthermore, the right estimation process depends on the available data.
Nevertheless, a simple approach will be presented in Appendix ?? of the online supplement.
2.1. The Basic Model
The model considers the πij’s to be “steady state” choice probabilities which allows one to dispense
with the (likely contentious) stipulation of decision making dynamics. At the core of this choice
model is the explicit modeling of a key aspect of recommendation networks, agents adopting the
choices of other agents. The choice probabilities may then be described as follows for i∈A, j ∈C:
πij = P (i chooses j, i does not consult network)
+ P (i adopts some other agent′s choice of j) (1)
modeled
=
P (i chooses j, i does not consult network)
+
∑
k∈A
P (i adopts k′s choice)P (k chooses j) (2)
= qij +
∑
k∈A
pikπkj. (3)
In this model, agents’ actions are driven by other agents’ actions, not their expectations of other
agents’ actions. (One might make a consistency argument that both should coincide in “steady
state”.) This may arise through a mechanism like observational learning, but that detail is not
addressed here. Naturally, it is required that the probabilities for the various actions that i may
take sum to one. Therefore, for all i∈A,
∑
k∈A
pik +
∑
j∈C
qij = 1, (4)
neatly segregating “adoption” and “direct selection” behavior. In addition, it is assumed that
pii = 0 (5)
for all i ∈A. Thus, each agent i is allowed |A|+ |C| − 1 distinct actions: selecting some element of
C without consulting his/her network and choosing to adopt the choice of some other agent in |A|.
Example 1 (The Classical (Disconnected) Setting). When P = 0, the choices agents
make are not coupled through a recommendation network. So πij = qij for all i∈A, j ∈C. 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (1) is the contribution from agent i acting
like an isolated individual, the second term accounts for agent i’s actions due to “influence” from
other agents. Equation (2) encodes the modeling assumption that an agents adopts others’ choices
independently of the choices the latter make. As such, the rejection of choices due to differing
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preferences is not modeled. Also, the phenomena whereby the knowledge of one’s influence changes
the choices one makes (image shaping) cannot be captured. These modeling gaps are acknowledged.
On a similar note, one implication of the model is that an agent may select, with non-zero
probability, something that he/she would never choose if the agent were isolated. This is not
an unrealistic outcome. An agent may accept the recommendations of other agents on the basis
that they have information he/she does not have. In day to day life, people regularly accept
recommendations from friends to “try something new”. As such, this would just be an instance of
an agent extending his/her choice consideration set due to peer influence.
From a broader perspective, equation (4) points to the implicit extension of the choice set from
C to include adopting advice from other agents, hinting at some underlying choice model over
agents’ actions. In this light, this model might be thought of as a “meta-model” of choice into
which single-agent choice models may be “plugged”.
2.2. Quantifying Choice Probabilities
The following regularity condition is assumed to ensure the πij’s are well-defined:
Assumption 1 (Collective Decisiveness). The set Q := {i ∈ A :
∑
j∈C qij > 0} 6= ∅, and for
each i ∈A\Q, there exists a sequence of agents (ai1, a
i
2, . . . , a
i
ni+1
) such that ai1 = i, a
i
ni+1
∈Q, and
for k= 1,2, . . . , ni, pai
k
ai
k+1
> 0.
Assumption 1 may be read as the requirement that, for each agent, there exists a “probabilistic
path” leading from that agent to some choice. It is necessary and sufficient for choice probabilities
to be well-defined, in a sense. The technical implications of Assumption 1 are listed below:
Lemma 1. The following hold if and only if Assumption 1 holds:
(a) The spectral radius1 of P (largest eigenvalue of P by magnitude) is strictly less than unity.
(b) (I −P )−1 is well-defined.
(c) For any principal sub-matrix2, V , of P , the matrix (I −V )−1 is well-defined.
With that, based on the definition of the model, the choice probabilities may be computed
through an elementary exercise in linear algebra.
Proposition 1 (Individual Choice Probabilities). The probability of agent i selecting
choice j is given by:
πij = e
T
i (I −P )
−1q(j). (6)
1The spectrum of a matrix P is the set of its eigenvalues, denoted as Λ(P ). The spectral radius of a matrix P is the
maximum of the absolute value of the elements of Λ(P ). It is also equal to max
‖x‖2=1
‖Px‖2 where ‖ · ‖2 is the 2-norm.
2Up to permutations, all principle sub-matrices map bijectively to and from non-empty subsets of A. For any non-
empty B ⊆A, the principle sub-matrix corresponding to B is the matrix where the rows and columns corresponding
to elements in A\B are removed.
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Proof. The result follows from equations (1)-(3) and part (b) of Lemma 1. 
To verify that, for agent i ∈ A, {πij}j∈C is indeed a probability distribution, observe that the
non-negativity of ei, (I − P )
−1 (= I + P + P 2+ . . .) and q(j) implies that πij ≥ 0 (j ∈ C), and by
recognizing that
∑
j∈C q
(j) = e−Pe= (I −P )e, it is easy to verify that
∑
j∈C πij =1.
Example 2 (The Impact of Accepting Recommendations). Consider the situation
where there is an “influential” agent (1) and two other agents (2 and 3). Suppose C = {A,B}, and
P =

 0 1/8 1/81/2 0 1/4
1/2 1/4 0

 , q(A) =

 1/20
0

 , q(B) =

 1/41/4
1/4

 .
This is illustrated in Figure 1 wherein agents are represented by circles, choices are represented
by squares, and decisions by agents are represented by outgoing arcs. In the absence of network
Figure 1 A visual representation of Examples 2, 3 and 4.
1
A B
2B 3 B
1/81/8
1/2 1/4
1/2
1/4
1/4
1/2
1/4
1/4
effects (thus normalizing the q(j)’s), agents 2 and 3 would each have chosen B with probability 1.
Network effects, however, result in them choosing A with probability 0.4. 
It is useful to point out (again) that the outputs of the model are expectations. Unless decision
dynamics are stipulated, the distribution of joint outcomes (vectors in C |A|) cannot be studied.
2.3. Insights through Analogies: Decision Dynamics and Learning Dynamics
As with most network models, insights may be obtained from analogies. Subsequently, equation
(6) will be discussed from the perspectives of an appropriate discrete time Markov chain and also
the “linear learning” of choice probabilities that both lead to equivalent probabilistic outcomes.
2.3.1. The Markov Chain Analogy. One may understand equation (6) to be evaluating the
limiting distribution (over absorbing states) of a random walk on a graph, describing the agents’
adoption propensities and preferences over alternatives, given some initial distribution over its
nodes (“states”). In this analogy, there are two types of states, “agent i to make the choice” for
each i ∈A and “choice j selected” for each j ∈C. The latter are, of course, absorbing states.
In the “first step”, agent i chooses j with probability qij (“Choice j selected”) and the probability
that he adopts the choice of agent k (“Agent k to make the choice”) is [eTi P ]k
Chen: Social Networks and Choice
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lines, in the “second step”, the probability of j being picked increases by eTi Pq
(j); in the “third step”,
it increases by eTi P
2q(j). This leads to the equivalent expression πij = e
T
i (I +P +P
2+ . . .) q(j).
Furthermore, under Assumption 1, with each step, the probability that a choice has not yet been
made (the probability of the states {Agent i to make the choice}i∈A) decreases towards zero.
Note that one should not interpret sample paths in this Markov chain as instances of decision
making dynamics. Rather, this analogy is a (standard) tool to explain how a certain measure of
“centrality” arises in network models (see §3.2).
2.3.2. The Linear Learning Connection. There is a compelling connection of this model
to models of “linear learning”. Consider a discrete time system where, in each time step, each agent
updates his/her beliefs by combining some private signal with the current beliefs of other agents
(including himself/herself). Denoting the belief of agent i at time t as x
(t)
i , and assuming that the
beliefs may be represented as real values, this may be written as:
x
(t+1)
i = αi
∑
k
vikx
(t)
k +(1−αi)x
(0)
i
where it is assumed that
∑
k
vik =1 for all i, the vik’s are all non-negative and αi ∈ [0,1] for all i.
This is a generalization of the well-known DeGroot Model of linear learning (DeGroot 1974)
(wherein αi = 1 for all i) and is similar to what was presented by Acemoglu et al. (2010) (who
studied a particular model of interaction and learning in a community). In contrast to the DeGroot
Model, the above generalization enables agents to balance “local” information, represented by the
agents’ initial beliefs, with a “global overview” gained from aggregating information from sources
across the network, and is thus a useful model of interaction and learning in communities.
Under mild conditions analogous to Assumption 1, the vector of beliefs converges:
lim
t→∞
x(t) = (I −DV )−1(I −D)x(0)
where x(t) is a vector of the x(t)i ’s, V is a matrix of the vik’s and D is a diagonal matrix of the αi’s.
Comparing this with equation (6), DV plays a similar role as P and (I −D)x(0) plays a similar
role as q(j) (for some j ∈C). (V is a scaling of P so the rows sum to 1, and D reverses that scaling.)
Given P and {q(j)}j∈C , one is able to find D, V and a x
(0) for each j such that the outcome of
the linear learning process generates the choice probabilities. Specifically, V is the matrix obtained
from P by normalizing its rows to sum to 1, and αi is the sum of entries in row i of P . To obtain
x(0) from q(j), once simply divides the i-th entry by 1−αi.
One may observe that, for a given i∈A, {qij/(1−
∑
k∈A pik)}j∈C (= {qij/(1−αi)}j∈C) is a discrete
probability distribution over C. (This follows from equation (4).) These discrete distributions may
be thought of as representing each agent’s idiosyncratic preferences over the set of possible choices
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(denote these “personal choice probabilities”). The choice probabilities of the model may be viewed
as the limit of a set of linear learning processes, one for each choice j ∈C. In particular, for choice
j ∈ C, the “private signals” used are vectors of the “personal choice probabilities” of the various
agents for choice j, obtained from normalizing {qij}j∈C for each agent i ∈ A and constructing a
vector of the entries corresponding to j.
One may argue that such processes of iterated averaging are suspect because it is unclear what
manner of object emerges from each iteration of averaging. (E.g.: when averaging subjective survey
responses across participants.) However, “personal choice probabilities” have objective economic
meaning. Performing a weighted average is, precisely, mixing. If one were to synchronously run |C|
such processes, one for each j ∈C, one would find that in each time step, the property of being a
set of probability distributions (one for each agent) is preserved, in particular in the limit.
This discussion hints once more, albeit more directly, that the model is a kind of “meta-model” of
choice wherein existing choice models may be augmented with information about agents’ propen-
sities to adopt the choices of others to study how social networks affect the choices people make.
2.4. Computational Issues.
Choice probabilities (and later, choice shares) can be computed in O(|A|3) floating point oper-
ations with the coefficient of the leading term being 2/3 (see, for instance, Trefethen and Bau
1997). Alternatively, because the matrix I−P is diagonally dominant and typically sparse, efficient
iterative methods may be applied (see, for instance, Saad 2003).
However, it is important to note that data generally contains noise, leading to considerations of
the sensitivity of choice share to perturbations of P and {q(j)}j∈C . Notably, whichever sensitivity
analysis approach is taken, qualitatively, the less “decisive” the agents are (the smaller the numbers
{
∑
j∈C qij}i∈A are), the closer the spectral radius of P is to 1, the more sensitive the choice shares
are to the input data, and the greater the care needed when interpreting computational results.
3. Choice in Communities
Having touched on the basics of the model from the elementary perspective of a single agent making
a choice, these ideas will now be extended to consider the extension to communities. “Choice
share”, an analogue to “market share”, will be presented along with a new measure of decision
making power of agents which will be termed ”decision share”. Decision share has a clear economic
interpretation and turns out to present a direct route for generalization to infinite choice sets.
3.1. Choice Share
While equation (6) considers the behavior of a single agent, applications typically require consid-
eration of the aggregate choices of a community. Therefore, a natural generalization would be to
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consider each agent having a non-negative endowment to allocate to the choices, and also to denote
the expected amount (of the total endowment) allocated to a given choice its “choice share”. (This
may be thought of as “market share”.) For each agent i ∈A, let i’s endowment be wi ≥ 0 and let
w be a vector of the wi’s. Denote the choice share of j ∈C with respect to endowment w, π
w
j :
Definition 1 (Choice Share). The choice share of choice j with respect to endowment w
(w≥ 0) is given by πwj :=
∑
i∈Awiπij .
Clearly,
πwj =w
T (I −P )−1q(j). (7)
Furthermore, πwj ≥ 0 for all j ∈C and
∑
j∈C π
w
j =
∑
i∈Awi (the entire endowment is allocated).
Example 3 (Choice Share: Revisiting Example 2). Consider Example 2 with w = 1
3
e.
The choice shares of A and B turn out to be 7/15 and 8/15 respectively. 
3.2. Decision Share
Choice share measures allocation of a community’s total endowment to choices in C. A related
question would be how much of the allocation of the total endowment to choices in C is, in
expectation, (ultimately) determined by a given agent i. Given an endowment vector w, let δwi
denote the “decision share” of agent i∈A, and define it as the expected amount allocated to choices
in C due to agent i selecting a choice without consulting his/her network. Decision share may be
quantified as follows:
Proposition 2 (Decision Share). The decision share of agent i∈A is given by:
δwi = c
w
i q¯i (8)
where w (w≥ 0) is an endowment, cw =wT (I −P )−1 and q¯=
∑
j∈C q
(j).
Proof. To derive the δwi ’s, a instance of the model will be considered where the choice shares
measure how much of the total endowment each agent directly allocates to the choices in C.
Consider a problem with a new set of choices C¯ = A. Replace {qij}i∈A,j∈C with {q˜}i∈A,j∈C¯ such
that for i∈A, q˜ii = q¯i = 1−
∑
k∈A pik and q˜ij = 0 for j 6= i. The interpretation is that when a choice
in C is selected, what is tracked is not how much of the endowment is allocated to that choice, but
rather which agent made that decision. Noting that q˜(i) = (1− eTi Pe)ei= (e
T
i (e−Pe))ei= (e
T
i q¯)ei,
and δwi =w
T (I −P )−1eie
T
i q¯= c
w
i q¯i the proof is complete. 
Example 4 (Decision Share: Revisiting Example 2). Consider Example 2 with w = 1
3
e.
The decision shares for agents 1, 2 and 3 are 7/10, 3/20 and 3/20 respectively. 
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Example 5 (Decision Share: Isotropic Fully Connected Network). Suppose for ρ ∈
[0,1), pik = ρ/(|A| − 1) for all i, k ∈A, i 6= k, then
δwi =
|A| − 1
|A| − 1+ ρ
(
(1− ρ)wi+
ρ
|A| − 1
wT e
)
gives the resulting decision shares for endowment w. 
Example 6 (Decision Share: “Hub and Spoke” Network). Let agent h ∈ A be the
“hub” in a “hub and spoke” network. Suppose ρ∈ [0,1], pih = ρ for all i, k ∈A, i 6= h, and suppose
the other p′iks are 0. Then
δwi =
{
(1− ρ)wi+ ρw
T e (i= h)
(1− ρ)wi (i 6= h)
gives the resulting decision shares for endowment w. 
Example 7 (Decision Share: Fully Connected Network with a Hub). Let agent h ∈
A be a “hub” in a fully connected network. Let ρF ∈ [0,1), ρH ∈ (0,1] with ρF +ρH ≤ 1. Consider an
increasing sequence of agents and their corresponding endowments {(An,w(n))}n≥1 with |An| →∞.
For each n≥ 1, let pik = ρF /(|An| − 1) for all i, k ∈An, i 6= k, k 6= h and pih = ρF/(|An| − 1) + ρH
for all i∈An, i 6= h. Suppose also that |w(n),i/w(n),k| ≤∆<∞ for all i, k ∈An. Then,
lim
n→∞
δ
w(n)
h
wT(n)e
=
(
1
ρH
−
ρF
1− ρF
)−1
.
gives the asymptotic ratio of the decision share for the “hub” agent h to the total endowment. 
The decision share of i depends on the extent to which others in the network adopt i’s decisions,
including choice adoption, (cwi ) and how “decisive” i is (q¯i). c
w
i is a network characteristic best
understood via the Markov chain analogy, and q¯i is an individual characteristic measuring how
often i makes decisions without consulting the wider network. These bear further explanation.
3.2.1. Centrality. In the discussion of §2.3.1, [(I −P )−1]ki gave the expected frequency that
state i (“agent i to make the choice”) would occur if the initial state were k (“agent k to make
the choice”). With that analogy in mind, note that when cwi (= w
T (I − P )−1ei) is large, agent i
would determine the (ultimate) choice more often. Thus, cwi is a measure of the reliance of the
network on agent i for decision making. In particular, it is a weighted centrality measure for agent
i, a generalization of Katz centrality (Katz 1953) or of Bonacich centrality (Bonacich 1987).
The “centrality-connection”, pioneered by authors like Katz (1953) and Bonacich (1987), has
been made in many economic settings where agents interactions may be described using a network.
For example, in network games with local payoff complementarities, “central” agents benefit by
free-riding on the efforts of other agents (Ballester et al. 2006, Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2007), or
by being compensated for the positive externalities they exert (Candogan et al. 2012); In financial
networks, shocks can be amplified through a network effect modulated by centrality and a market
effect due to “fire-sales” of illiquid assets that further depress asset values (Chen et al. 2013).
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3.2.2. Decisiveness. Yet, “central” as it has been in measuring the “importance” of nodes in
networks, centrality is not the sole determinant of decision share. Decision share is the product of
cwi (=w
T (I−P )−1ei) and q¯i (= e
T
i (I−P )e). The latter term is the i-th component of
∑
j∈C q
(j), and
the larger it is, the more likely agent i makes a choice “on his own” rather than by adopting another
agent’s choice. Thus, it is not unreasonable to use q¯i as a measure of agent i’s “decisiveness”.
One might say that decision share is centrality — the extent to which the community leans on
an agent for decision making — modulated by “decisiveness”, which gives the likelihood that that
agent “decides” when “called upon” to do so. This is reasonable and intuitive.
Additionally, the more “decisive” agents in A are, the lower the impact of network effects; and
with “indecisive agents”, one might reason that, given reasonable decision dynamics, “herding”
would be observable in the joint distribution of choices. A brief discussion on this is provided in
Appendix ??, including the quantification of the expected size of the largest “herd” in a specialized
setting which turns out to be a new result for the classical Polya urn model.
3.2.3. Putting the Two Together. To connect the two, consider a mechanical analogy
describing the ultimate selection of choices. Let there be a network of pipes with leaky joints, one
corresponding to each i ∈A. The fraction of fluid entering joint i that flows out to joint k ∈A is
pik and the fraction that leaks is q¯i. Flow from joint to joint corresponds to choice adoption, and
leakage corresponds to ultimate choice selection. Thus, giving joint i an initial infusion of wi for
each i ∈A, the total flow into joint i is cwi =w
T (I−P )−1ei. With a fraction q¯i leaking out, the total
amount that leaks from joint i is δwi (= c
w
i q¯i). This is illustrated by (the bold arrow in) Figure 2.
Figure 2 Decision Share: The View from Agent i
i
(1− q¯i)c
w
i
cwi C
δw
i
= cw
i
q¯i
3.3. Generalization: Beyond Finite Choice Sets.
Decision share provides a convenient route to generalization. Suppose C were no longer a finite
set. Taking the place of the q(j)’s would be a collection of probability measures on C, one for each
agent (the set of agents remaining finite). In this setting the decision shares remain well-defined,
being fully determined by w and P . Qualitatively, the resulting “choice share distribution” of the
total endowment
∑
i∈Awi would be a “mixture” of the aforementioned probability distributions
(over C) associated with the various agents, with the decision shares as the “mixing weights”.
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Specifically, suppose each agent i ∈A had preferences over C described by probability measure
µi. Consider a subset S ⊆C. The choice share of S is then
∑
i∈A
δwi µi(S), (9)
which is natural and intuitive given the definition of decision share.
Equation (9) suggests that one may view choice outcomes as arising from a latent class model
with |A| classes of choice behaviors described by {µi}i∈A. In particular, an agent with index i
(agent i) behaves like “someone” in class k with probability δeik . Alternatively, {δ
ei
k }k∈A describes
the impact of the various agents in A on agent i’s eventual choice.
3.4. A Comparison with Kempe et al. (2003, 2005).
It would be useful to touch on how the model relates to those presented in Kempe et al. (2003,
2005). In particular, it is shown that this choice model is not just a special case of their models
with multiple “activation” categories. To this end, following an equivalence result of Kempe et al.
(2005), it would suffice to consider their general “decreasing cascade model”.
Consider using Monte Carlo simulation of some “cascade process” constructed to replicate the
expected outcome of the model. Sample runs should be based on equation (4), which outlines
the possible actions of each agent, and equations (1)-(3) should be deducible from the stipulated
dynamics. Thus leading, under Assumption 1, to equation (6).
This may be sketched out as follows, begin by sampling the agents who select a choice without
consulting their neighbors (and their choices) based on {q(j)}j∈C . (For alignment with the “decreas-
ing cascade model”, let some choice u ∈ C correspond to “non-activation”.) A kind of “cascade
process” will be used to determine the choices of the remaining agents, who will adopt the choices
of others. Following Kempe et al. (2003, 2005), let agents who have already made choices in C (less
u) be known as “activated” agents. For each “unactivated” (undecided) agent i except those that
picked u initially, each “activated” agent k with pik > 0 will have, at most, one opportunity to have
the former agent adopt the the “activated” agent’s choice (with some probability to be described
later), thus “activating” the undecided agent (none if pik = 0). Once no “activation attempts”
remain, the process terminates. Naturally, instances where (i) not all agents make a choice, or
where (ii) no agent picks u initially but some agent remains unactivated, will be discarded.
In line with equation (4), the aforementioned “activation probabilities” may be computed from
{pik}i∈A,k∈A by conditioning on the set of agents whose choices were not adopted (“failed activation
attempts”) and also on the event that an “unactivated” agent did not make a choice without
consulting his/her network (beginning “unactivated”). So, one may indeed deduce equations (1)-(3)
from the stipulated dynamics. This is consistent with the interpretation that each agent selects from
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an “extended choice set” comprising choices in C and the adoption of the choices of other agents.
The sequencing of “activation attempts” may be done arbitrarily as, equivalently, an outcome
is fully determined by a sample (with rejection) from a discrete distribution with |A| + |C| − 1
categories for each agent i∈A with selection probabilities {pik}k∈A,k 6=i and {qij}j∈C .
In the above “cascade process”, the activation probabilities are, for each undecided agent, strictly
increasing in the set of agents who had previously “attempted” and failed to “activate” the unde-
cided agent. That violates the assumptions of the “decreasing cascade model” which requires those
probabilities to be decreasing. This is because each “failed activation attempt” increases the set of
actions (to adopt the choice of some other agent) that were not taken. Conditional on the aforemen-
tioned set of actions not being taken, the probability of each of the remaining actions necessarily
increases in that set of actions. Example 8 will make this clear.
Example 8 (An “Increasing” Cascade). Consider, again, Example 2 and an outcome
defined by the bold arrows of Figure 3. Agents 1 and 2 have both selected choice B without con-
sulting others in the network (let A correspond to u). They then will attempt to “activate” agent
3 (get agent 3 to adopt their choices) according to the “cascade process” sketched out above.
Figure 3 A visual representation of Example 8.
1
A B
2B 3 B
1/81/8
1/2 1/4
1/2
1/4
1/4
1/2
1/4
1/4
If agent 1 attempted to “activate” agent 3 first, the probability of “activation” would be p31
p31+p32
=
2
3
, and if agent 2 attempted to “activate” agent 3 after agent 1 failed, “activation” would occur with
certainty ( p32
p32
= 1). Similarly, if agent 2 attempted to “activate” agent 3 first, the probability of
“activation” would be p32
p31+p32
= 1
3
, and if agent 1 attempted to “activate” agent 3 after agent 2 failed,
“activation” would occur with certainty ( p31
p31
= 1). So for a given “activated” agent, “activation”
probabilities are strictly increasing in the set of agents who failed to activate agent 3. 
Thus, general as the models of Kempe et al. (2003, 2005) are, the model presented here is not a
mere special case featuring multiple “activation” categories.
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4. Selected Applications of the Model
Now, having previously touched upon the descriptive aspects of the model, to illustrate some of the
possible ways to put the model to work, some applications for prescription will be touched upon.
Specifically, an application of the model to identifying “influential” consumers for social marketing
will be presented, followed by a more traditional example on pricing and price competition.
4.1. Social Marketing: Brand Ambassador Selection
In the introduction, a great deal was said about social marketing. In this sub-section, a problem
faced by the many marketing departments is cast in terms of this model. Specifically, as businesses
seek to co-opt consumers as product evangelists, they face the problem of identifying who to reach
out to so as to maximize the effectiveness of their marketing dollar.
Here, the “brand ambassador” selection problem will be introduced, and it will be shown that
though it is NP-hard, it admits and efficiently computable approximate solution that is guaranteed
to be at least 1− 1/e (about 63%) as good as the optimal solution.
Given some choice j ∈C (that represents the brand whose choice share one seeks to maximize),
the objective of the “brand ambassador” selection problem is to pick a subset B ⊆A of at most K
agents, who will select choice j exclusively, such that the choice share of j is maximized. Making
P and {q(l)}l∈C functions of the set of brand ambassadors selected, brand ambassadors’ exclusive
recommendation of j may be modeled as follows:
With apologies for the abuse of notation, for B ⊆A, let
[P (B)]ik =
{
0 (i∈B)
pik (i 6∈B)
(10)
and
[q(l)(B)]k =


0 (k ∈B, l 6= j)
1 (k ∈B, l= j)
qkl (k 6∈B).
(11)
These mean that agents selected as brand ambassadors are modeled as changing their behavior such
that they recommend and select choice j only (with probability 1). Other agents are unaffected.
(As a technical digression, note that if Assumption 1 is valid when B = ∅, then it is valid for
all B ⊆A. This is because P = P (∅)≥ P (B) entry-wise for all B ⊆A, implying that the spectral
radius of P (∅) is greater than P (B) since both are non-negative matrices.)
The brand ambassador selection problem may be expressed as follows:
max{πwj (B) :B ⊆A, |B| ≤K}. (12)
Due to its combinatorial nature, it is not surprising that:
Proposition 3. The optimization problem (12) is NP-hard.
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In spite of this result, it remains possible to obtain good solutions for the brand ambassador selec-
tion problem. It will be demonstrated that problem (12) admits an efficient (1− 1
e
) approximation
via a greedy selection strategy that may be described as follows:
Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm (subject to maximum cardinality K)
S0←∅
for i=1 to K do
a∗i ← arg max
ai∈A\Si−1
πwj (Si−1 ∪{ai})
Si ← Si−1 ∪{a
∗
i }
end for
return SK
As in Kempe et al. (2003, 2005), the proof of approximability makes use of a classic result due to
Nemhauser et al. (1978) on the approximate maximization of monotone submodular functions with
the greedy algorithm. A submodular function f over a set Ω is a set function such that for every
X,Y ⊆Ω with X ⊆ Y and every x∈Ω\Y , f(X ∪{x})−f(X)≥ f(Y ∪{x})−f(Y ) (see Chapter 44
of Schrijver (2004)). A monotone submodular function is a submodular function such that for every
X,Y ⊆ Ω with X ⊆ Y , f(Y ) ≥ f(X). (Notably, the submodularity proof in Kempe et al. (2005)
relies on the “activation probabilities” possessing the decreasing property. This is not present in
the natural “cascade model” that generates the results of this model (§3.4).)
Theorem 1 (Nemhauser et al. (1978)). If the greedy algorithm is used for the approximate
maximization of a non-negative monotone submodular set function f over a set Ω, the value of the
solution generated by the greedy algorithm when it terminates at a set of size K, SGreedyK , satisfies
f(SGreedyK )≥
(
1−
1
e
)
max
S⊆Ω
|S|≤K
f(S).
(The interested reader may refer to Krause and Golovin (2012) for more details on the maximiza-
tion of monotone submodular functions, including a minor extension to the above result.)
In the brand ambassador selection problem, the incremental choice share due to adding an
additional brand ambassador is always non-negative (choice share is monotone in B):
Lemma 2 (Incremental Benefit of an Additional Brand Ambassador). If a∈A\B,
πwj (B ∪{a})−π
w
j (B) =w
TMBea
∑
l∈C\{j} qal+
∑
k∈A pak (1−πkj(B))
1+ pTaMBea
≥ 0, (13)
where MB = (I −P (B))
−1 and pTa is the row of P corresponding to agent a.
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Before going on to establish the submodularity of πwj (·), it would be instructive to discuss equa-
tion (13) in the context of some recent empirical findings. In a recent study, Godes and Mayzlin
(2009) used data from a large-scale field test and an online experiment to study the efficacy of the
proactive management of customer-to-customer communication by firms. Among other findings,
they provided evidence that it is not necessarily “highly loyal” customers who generate the impor-
tant incremental “word-of-mouth” (WOM) as one might have expected, and that it may be more
beneficial for firms to target “less loyal” customers.
In equation (13), wTMBea may be viewed as a weighted centrality measure for agent a. (Note that
MB decreases entry-wise in B, so the centrality of each agent decreases as more brand ambassadors
are added.) The larger wTMBea is, the larger the choice share contribution from including agent a.
This accords well with the “folk” practice, mentioned in Godes and Mayzlin (2009), wherein firms
seeking to engineer WOM begin by attempting to identify “key influencers”.
On the other hand, including agent a would not accord j an incremental benefit amounting to
all of agent a’s “residual” centrality (given the current set of brand ambassadors). Firstly, agent
a may already been selecting/recommending choice j himself/herself. Furthermore, a’s inclusion
causes an indirect reduction in the choice share of j because agent a would have, prior to being
included in the set of brand ambassadors, selecting choice j due to adopting the choices of other
agents. This is why, as suggested by Godes and Mayzlin (2009), firms seeking to engineer WOM
should identify “key influencers” outside “communities” of “loyal users”.
While the equation (13) hints at the submodularity of πwj (·), it is insufficient to establish sub-
modularity as MB decreases entry-wise in B. Still, submodularity can indeed be demonstrated:
Proposition 4 (Submodularity in the Brand Ambassador Setting). πwj : A → R is
monotone and submodular for all w≥ 0.
With this, it follows immediately from Theorem 1 that:
Theorem 2 (Approximability in the Brand Ambassador Setting). The optimization
problem (12) admits a
(
1− 1
e
)
-optimal greedy approximation described by Algorithm 1.
When agents are associated with heterogeneous costs, one has to deal with more general knapsack
constraints. Sviridenko (2004) developed a variant of the greedy algorithm that produces a
(
1− 1
e
)
approximation, but the computational cost is considerably higher (O(n5) function evaluations).
Further discussion on this application is deferred to Appendix ?? of the online supplement.
4.2. Exogenous Parameters and Choice Share: Optimization
One of the most important business applications of discrete choice is the study of the variation of
choice probabilities with respect to (exogenous) changes in problem parameters such as price and
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the “design” of choices (for instance, product characteristics). Once estimated from data, choice
models are applied in the pricing of offerings or even in product-line design.
Early in this paper, the model presented was cited as a “meta-model” of choice, which might have
attracted some protest at the time because {q(j)}j∈C was constant, thus apparently precluding the
aforementioned applications. In conjunction with the foregoing discussion of the brand ambassador
selection problem, this sub-section will make clear that no such restriction exists.
Here, the model will be generalized to relate the choice share to an exogenous parameter. This
will be illustrated, mainly, by way of an extended example on pricing/price competition.
4.2.1. Extending the Model. Suppose that for all i ∈A, k ∈A, l ∈ C, pik(·) and qil(·) are
functions of a (possibly multi-variate) parameter u∈Rd with base values P (0) = P and q(j)(0) = q(j)
for all j ∈ C. Once again, with apologies for the abuse of notation, define P (u) to be the matrix
containing the entries {pik(u)}i∈A,k∈A, q
(j)(u) the vector containing the entries {qij(u)}i∈A, and
πwj (u) =w
T (I −P (u))−1q(j)(u) (14)
to be the choice share of j given endowment w (w≥ 0) and parameter u. Naturally, a mild assump-
tion will be made to ensure a meaningful mapping from u to the pik(·)’s and the qij(·)’s:
Assumption 2. There exists a non-empty set T ⊆ Rd such that for all u ∈ T , Assumption 1
holds for P (u) and {q(j)(u)}j∈C , P (u) is a non-negative matrix, q
(j)(u) is non-negative for all
j ∈ C, and
∑
j∈C qij(u) +
∑
k∈A pik(u) = 1 for all i ∈ A. Furthermore, without loss of generality,
0∈ T and P (0)= P and q(j)(0) = q(j) for all j ∈C.
Consider the following example illustrating how this framework may be applied:
Example 9 (Univariate Affine Variation of the Preferences of a Single Agent).
Consider the special case of “affine variation” in the preferences of some agent r¯ ∈A, where P (u) =
P −uer¯v
T with qj(u) = qj+uer¯, q
l(u) = ql−uβler¯ for all l ∈C\{j}, and
∑
k∈A vk+
∑
l∈C\{j} βl = 1.
Then the following expression for the choice share of j:
πwj (u) = π
w
j (0)+uθir¯(0)
1−
∑
k∈A vkπ
ek
j (0)
1+u
∑
k∈A vkθkr¯(0)
(15)
holds on an interval containing 0 where θik(u) is defined in Lemma 3 of Appendix A.
In the case of “pure preference shifting” where v = 0, equation (15) reduces to πwj (u) = π
w
j (0)+
uθir¯(0). Equation (15) may be obtained using the same method used in Lemma 2. Furthermore,
Lemma 2 can be easily verified to be a special case of equation (15). 
Chen: Social Networks and Choice
00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 19
4.2.2. Pricing and Price Competition. As an extended example, a simple model of pric-
ing/price competition will be presented. Here, some strict subset of choices D⊂C will correspond
to products sold by different firms which are engaged in price competition. (It may be taken that
C\D contains an “outside option”.) Here, endowments should be interpreted as “units of choice”,
and choices and firms will be referred to interchangeably using elements of D.
For j ∈D, denote the base profit for j per “unit of choice” by mj (mj > 0), and denote the firm’s
(real-valued) decision variable, the price discount to be granted, as zj . Denote the vector of price
discounts for D\{j} as z−j. Of course, the model parameters are determined by {zl}l∈D.
Suppose that, for j ∈D, the parameters may be described as univariate functions for any given
z−j. The following model that describes substitution into a choice as it becomes more attractive:
Given z−j , suppose that the set T on which Assumption 2 is a non-empty interval and on T ,
• qij(·, z−j) is concave and strictly increasing, and
• qil(·, z−j) (l ∈C, l 6= j) and pik(·, z−j) (k ∈A), are convex and decreasing.
(Appropriately defined affine functions satisfy this.) Suppose, in addition, that for j ∈D, firm j is
limited to offering price discounts zj ∈ Sj := [Lj,Uj] where and Lj >−∞ and Uj ≤mj .
For (zj, z−j) where choice shares are well-defined, π
w
j (zj, z−j) may be defined analogously as
before and the profit for j ∈D denoted as
Πj(zj, z−j) = (mj − zj)π
w
j (zj, z−j). (16)
Otherwise, let the profit for j ∈D be −∞. Thus, given z−j, firm j’s profit is concave in zj:
Proposition 5 (Concavity of Profit). For all j ∈D, Πj(·, z−j) is concave on Sj.
This means that the associated single player pricing problemmay be efficiently solved. Furthermore,
Proposition 5 allows one to quickly deduce that:
Theorem 3 (Equilibrium in Pricing Game). The game G= ({Πj}j∈D,{Sj}j∈D) has a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, a simple model of choice where decisions are influenced by peers on a recommendation
network was introduced premised on the notion that the presence of a recommendation network
extends the set of available decisions to include choice adoption behavior. An immediate outcome
of the modeling assumptions is that each agent’s choice probabilities turns out to be a kind of
“mixture” of the “personal choice probabilities” of all agents in the network.
Through efficiently computable closed form solutions, the model readily yields insights on how
agents in a recommendation network make choices. In particular, the concept of decision share,
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introduced in this paper, neatly shows how “influence” in a recommendation network is driven by
both “centrality” and “decisiveness”. The natural manner through which decision share enables
generalization to more generic choice sets suggests that it is a natural measure of “influence” in a
recommendation network.
The model is potentially applicable to large-scale influence maximization computations. In par-
ticular, the brand ambassador selection problem was introduced and shown to admit efficiently
computable (1 − 1
e
)-optimal approximations via a greedy selection strategy. A generalization to
continuous choice sets was also described through the use of the notion of “decision share”, a
natural adjoint to “choice share”, allowing the model to be used in more general settings.
Finally, it bears repeating that the model presented in this paper may be considered a “meta-
model” of choice. In principle, any choice model may be extended to include adopting the action
of another agent as an extension of the choice set, allowing it to be “plugged in” to this model,
thus enabling one to extend existing choice models to model social network effects.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. If (a) holds, then the sum I +P +P 2+ . . . is well-defined, implying (b). Conversely,
(b) cannot hold unless (a) holds. So (a) and (b) are equivalent. Clearly, (c) implies (b). To see how (b) implies
(c), consider the matrix PV formed by keeping the entries corresponding to V and setting the rest to 0. For
n ≥ 1, the entries of P nV and the corresponding entries of V
n are equal and P n dominates P nV entry-wise.
Therefore, (I −PV )−1 is well-defined and so is (I −V )−1. So (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent.
To show that Assumption 1 implies (a), first note that the Perron-Fro¨benius Theorem states that P ,
being a non-negative matrix has a positive real eigenvalue λ that is maximal in terms of magnitude with
corresponding left eigenvector, v, having strictly positive terms. Without loss of generality, suppose vT v =
1 so v ≤ e. Let ǫ =
(
mini∈Q
∑
j∈C
qij
)(
mini∈A\Q
∏ni
k=1 pniknik+1
)
(ǫ > 0 by Assumption 1), and let N =
maxi∈A\Qni. Since the row sums of P are non-negative but at most unity, for all m,n > 0 and vectors
u ≥ 0, uTP ne ≥ uTP n+me ≥ 0. Therefore, for all m > 0, λmN = vTPmNv ≤ vTPmNe ≤
∑
i∈A
vie
T
i P
mnie ≤
(1− ǫ)mvT e. This implies that λ< 1, meaning (a) holds.
To show how (a) implies Assumption 1, the contrapositive will be proven. Suppose Assumption 1 does
not hold. If Q= ∅ then P is a row-stochastic matrix and 1 is an eigenvalue of P with its corresponding left
eigenvector consisting of all ones, so suppose Q 6= ∅. Let Y be the subset of A\Q for which no path satisfying
the requirements of Assumption 1 exists. For all i ∈ Y , by equation (4),
∑
k∈Y
pik = 1. Otherwise a path
satisfying the requirements of Assumption 1 may be constructed by augmenting a path from an agent in
(A\Q)\Y to Q. Thus, the sub-matrix of P corresponding to the agents in Y is row-stochastic. So 1 is an
eigenvalue of P with its corresponding left eigenvector having 1’s in the entries corresponding to agents in
the set Y and 0’s elsewhere. So Assumption 1 implies (a), meaning Assumption 1 and (a) are equivalent,
completing the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. The result will be proven via a reduction of the Vertex Cover Problem which
is known to be NP-complete. Consider an instance of the Vertex Cover Problem defined by an undirected
graph G= (V,E) and an integer K. Therein, a set, S, of K vertices is sought such that every edge in E has
at least one end point in S.
Create an instance of the Brand Ambassador Selection Problem with A= V and C = {α,β}, with j = α
and w as the vector of all ones. For all i ∈ A, qiα = 0 and qiβ = 1/2. (Note that Assumption 1 is satisfied.)
Denote η(i) as the number of vertices adjacent to i in the graph G and let η =max
i∈A
η(i). For each i∈A, let
pik = 0 if (i, k) 6∈E and pik =
1
2η(i)
otherwise.
For any vertex cover S, P (S) and {q(l)(S)}l∈C are such that agents in A\S never directly adopt each other’s
choices. It then follows that πwα (S) =
1
2
(n+K). But for any subset of A, S˜ where |S˜|=K and S˜ is not a
vertex cover. Then there exists (r, s)∈E such that r, s 6∈ S˜. This implies that πwα (S˜)≤
1
2
(n+K)− 1
4η
<πwα (S).
By Lemma 2, πwα (·) is monotone. Therefore any optimal solution to this instance of the Brand Ambassador
Problem may be (trivially) identified with a solution to the Vertex Cover Problem. In fact, a bijection exists
between the set of optimal solutions for brand ambassador problem and the set of vertex covers. Therefore,
the Brand Ambassador Problem is at least as computationally hard as the Vertex Cover Problem. 
Proof of Lemma 2. By the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula for an invertible matrix A, if A+ uvT
is invertible, then
(A+ uvT )−1 =A−1−
A−1uvTA−1
1+ vTA−1u
. (17)
The corollary follows by applying this to
πwj (B ∪{a}) =w
T (I −P (B)+ eap
T
a )
−1

q(j)(B)+

pTa e+ ∑
l∈C\{j}
qal

ea

 ,
and rearranging terms. (In doing so, note that pTaMBq
(j)(B) =
∑
k∈A
pakπkj(B).) 
Proof of Proposition 4. Monotonicity follows from Lemma 2. To prove submodularity, it suffices to verify
that for all X ⊆ Y ⊆A and a∈A\Y ,
πwj (X ∪{a})− π
w
j (X)≥ π
w
j (Y ∪{a})− π
w
j (Y )
and to do so for all non-negative w. Thus, it is necessary and sufficient to show that for all i∈A,
πeij (X ∪{a})− π
ei
j (X)≥ π
ei
j (Y ∪{a})− π
ei
j (Y ) (18)
for arbitrary X , Y , a satisfying X ⊆ Y ⊆A and a∈A\Y .
Before proceeding, first, observe that
πeij (X) = 1 if i∈B. (19)
Now, consider the four possible cases, i= a, i∈X , i∈ Y \X and i∈A\(Y ∪{a}).
When i= a, πeij (X ∪{a})−π
ei
j (X) = 1−π
ei
j (X) and π
ei
j (Y ∪{a})−π
ei
j (Y ) = 1−π
ei
j (Y ) by equation (19).
Since πeij (Y )≥ π
ei
j (X) by monotonicity, inequality (18) holds.
When i∈X , πeij (X ∪{a}) = π
ei
j (X) = π
ei
j (Y ∪{a}) = π
ei
j (Y ) = 1 by equation (19), so inequality (18) holds.
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When i ∈ Y \X , πeij (X ∪ {a})− π
ei
j (X) ≥ 0 by monotonicity and π
ei
j (Y ∪ {a})− π
ei
j (Y ) = 1 − 1 = 0 by
equation (19), so inequality (18) holds.
For each i ∈A\(Y ∪ {a}), consider equations (1)-(3) which defines each of πeij (X ∪ {a}), π
ei
j (X), π
ei
j (Y ∪
{a}), and πeij (Y ). This may be written as
πeij (S)−
∑
k 6∈Y∪{a}
pikπ
ek
j (S) = qij +
∑
k∈Y∪{a}
pikπ
ek
j (S) (20)
for S ∩ (Y ∪ {a}) = ∅. For given i ∈ A\(Y ∪ {a}), the “analogous” coefficients and the constant remain the
same for all such sets S. This is because the respective rows of P and q(j) remain unchanged.
By part (c) of Lemma 1, it follows that πeij (S) may be expressed as a non-negative linear combination of
{πekj (S)}k∈Y∪{a} plus a non-negative constant:
πeij (S) = ρij(S)+
∑
k∈Y∪{a}
γik(S)π
ek
j (S). (21)
This is achieved by considering the linear system defined by (20) for i∈A\(Y ∪{a}) and “pre-multiplying it”
by (I −PA\(Y ∪{a}))−1 where PA\(Y ∪{a}) is the principle sub-matrix of P defined by the subset A\(Y ∪{a}).
For each i ∈ A\(Y ∪ {a}), the constants and the coefficients of {πekj (S)}k∈Y∪{a} of equation (21) are the
same for every choice of S ⊆ A satisfying S ∩ (Y ∪ {a}) = ∅. Therefore, since inequality (18) holds for all
i∈ Y ∪{a}, inequality (18) holds when i∈A\(Y ∪{a}). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 is valid for P (u) and let θik(u) := e
T
i (I −P (u))
−1ek. For all i∈A,
d
du
πeij (u) =
∑
k∈A
θik(u)Gkj(u), (22)
d
du
θik(u) =
∑
s∈A
∑
r∈A
θir(u)θsk(u)
d
du
prs(u) (23)
and
d2
du2
π(i,j,C,P )(u) =
∑
k∈A
[
Gkj(u)
d
du
θ(i,k,C,P )(u)+Hkj(u)θ(i,k,C,P )(u)
]
(24)
where
Gkj(u) :=
d
du
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
πesj (u)
d
du
pks(u) (25)
and
Hkj(u) :=
d2
du2
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
πesj (u)
d2
du2
pks(u)+
∑
s∈A
d
du
pks(u)
d
du
πesj (u). (26)
Proof. Recall that for a differentiable univariate matrix function M , if M(x) is non-singular,
d
dx
M−1(x) =−M−1(x)
(
d
dx
M(x)
)
M−1(x).
By (a) of Lemma 1, (I −P (u))−1 is well-defined, so through straightforward differentiation, one obtains
d
du
πeij (u) = e
T
i (I −P (u))
−1
[
d
du
q(j)(u)+
(
d
du
P (u)
)
(I −P (u))−1q(j)(u)
]
.
By collecting terms, one arrives at equation (22). Equation (23) may be obtained in a similar fashion.
Equation (24) may be obtained by differentiating equation (22). 
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Lemma 4 (Monotonicity). For given j ∈C, if for all i∈A, qij(·) is increasing, pik(·) are decreasing for
all k ∈A, and qil(·) are decreasing for all l ∈C\{j}, then for a non-negative initial endowment w, πwj (·) is
increasing on T , and for l ∈C\{j}, πwl (·) is decreasing on T .
Proof. The proof of this lemma makes use of Lemma 3 in Appendix A.
First, note that because (I −P (u))−1 = I +P (u)+P (u)2+ . . . and P (u)≥ 0,
θik(u)≥ 0 (27)
for all i, k ∈A.
Now, for k ∈A,
∑
s∈A
pks(u)+
∑
l∈C
qkl(u) = 1, so
0 =
d
du
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
d
du
pks(u)+
∑
l∈C\{j}
d
du
qkl(u)
≤
d
du
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
d
du
pks(u)
≤
d
du
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
πesj (u)
d
du
pks(u)
= Gkj(u) (defined by (25) in Lemma 3)
where the first inequality follows from the hypothesis that qil(·) are decreasing for all l ∈ C\{j}, and the
second inequality follows from the fact that πekj (u) ∈ [0,1] for all k ∈A. Taken together with equation (22)
of Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, one may deduce that πwj (·) is increasing.
For l ∈C\{j}, since πesl (u)≥ 0 for all s∈A and, by hypothesis, the other terms on the right hand side of
equation (25) are non-positive, Gkl(u)≤ 0. Thus, similarly, one may deduce that πwl (·) is decreasing. 
Notably, Lemma 4 generalizes Lemma 2.
Lemma 5 (Concavity/Convexity). Suppose the conditions of Lemma 4 hold and, in addition, ∀ i∈A,
qij(·) is concave, pik(·) is convex for all k ∈A, and qil(·) is convex for all l ∈ C\{j}, then πwj (·) is concave
on T , and for l ∈C\{j}, πwl (·) is convex on T .
Proof. The proof of this lemma makes use of Lemma 3 in Appendix A.
As with (27) in the proof of Lemma 4, θik(u)≥ 0 for all i, k ∈A. Since pik(·) is decreasing for all i, k ∈A,
in conjunction with equation (23), one obtains
d
du
θik(u)≤ 0. (28)
for all i, k ∈A.
In the proof of Lemma 4, it was previously shown that Gij(u) (see (25) in Lemma 3) is non-negative. Based
on equation (24) of Lemma 3, to show that πeij (·) is concave, it would be sufficient to show that Hkj(u)≤ 0.
For expositional convenience, equation (26) is reproduced here:
Hkj(u) :=
d2
du2
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
πesj (u)
d2
du2
pks(u)+
∑
s∈A
d
du
pks(u)
d
du
πesj (u).
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The hypothesis that pik(·) is decreasing for all i, k ∈A and (28) imply that
∑
s∈A
d
du
pks(u)
d
du
πesj (u)≤ 0.
Now, for k ∈A and any fixed γs ∈ [0,1] for each s∈A, by manipulating equation (4), one obtains
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
γspks(u) = 1−
∑
l∈C\{j}
qkl(u)−
∑
s∈A
(1− γs)pks(u).
This implies that
d2
du2
qkj(u)+
∑
s∈A
γs
d2
du2
pks(u) =−
∑
l∈C\{j}
d2
du2
qkl(u)−
∑
s∈A
(1− γs)
d2
du2
pks(u)≤ 0
where the inequality follows from the convexity of qkl(·) for l ∈C\{j} and the convexity of pks(·) for s∈A.
Substituting πesj (u) for γs, the fact that Hkj(u)≤ 0 is established. Therefore, π
ei
j (·) is concave. Combining
this with Corollary 1, it follows that πwj (·) is concave.
Now consider l ∈C\{j}. In the proof of Lemma 4, it has already been shown that Gil(u)≤ 0. So it suffices
to show that Hkl(u) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ A. By Lemma 4,
d
du
πesl (u) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ A. It then follows from the
hypothesis of Lemma 4 that Hkl(u)≥ 0. In the same way as before, one may deduce that πwl (·) is convex. 
Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 of Appendix A, the πwj ’s are monotone and concave
in the discounts granted. Therefore, where choice shares are well-defined,
d2
dz2j
Πj(zj, z−j) = (mj − zj)
d2
dz2j
π(zj , z−j)− 2
d
dzj
π(zj, z−j) (29)
≤ 0. (30)
Noting that Πj(zj , z−j) = −∞ for zj where choice shares are not well-defined, it follows that Πj(·, z−j) is
concave on Sj. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Since the pay-offs are concave on the respective Sj ’s, which are compact convex
sets, G is a concave game. By a result due to Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan, G has a pure strategy equilibrium
(see, for instance, §1.3.3 of Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). 
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Supplement to: Social Networks and the Choices People Make
Appendix B: Parameter Estimation in a Restricted Setting
Here, an approach for estimating {pik}i∈A,k∈A and {q
(j)}j∈C is described in a setting where empirical
choice shares at an individual level (πij for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C) are available, as well as information
on the agents and their preferences, possibly via a questionnaire.
As in the work of Toubia et al. (2003), the “correct” parameters are viewed to be an element of
a polyhedral set, and information about the parameters may be used to reduce the size of the set.
In principle, any point within that set (or one within its relative interior) may be used as a point
estimate. (Toubia et al. (2003) focus on the analytic center as they use its properties to develop
adaptive questionnaires for conjoint analysis.)
This Appendix discusses the formulation of a suitable set of linear constraints to define the
set, after which an element within it may be drawn to obtain a point estimate of {pik}i∈A,k∈A and
{q(j)}j∈C .
Fundamental Constraints
Equations (??)-(??) describe the primary relationships that are to be respected:
πij = qij +
∑
k∈A
pikπkj
for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. However, in practice, it may be necessary to add “slacks” in case a perfect fit
is not possible. This is because when data about the agents’ preferences are used improve estimates
(and to avoid the trivial solution qij = πij for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C, and pik = 0 for all i, k ∈ A),
the problem may become infeasible due to possible inconsistency in that data. As such, one may
consider, instead:
πij + ǫ
+
ij − ǫ
−
ij = qij +
∑
k∈A
pikπkj for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. (B1)
Naturally, one would require that
pik ≥ 0 for all i, k ∈ A, (B2)
pii = 0 for all i ∈ A (B3)
and
qij ≥ 0, ǫ
+
ij ≥ 0, ǫ
−
ij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ A, j ∈ C. (B4)
In contrast to what was proposed for equations (??)-(??), equation (??) can be represented
exactly: ∑
k∈A
pik +
∑
j∈C
qij = 1 for all i ∈ A. (B5)
S-1
Incorporating Information
Subsequently, four classes of information on the agents will be modeled as constraints on agents’
preferences: (i) the relative importance of groups of agents, (ii) relative preference between choices,
(iii) decisiveness of an agent, and (iv) presence/absence of reliance on other agents (sparsity).
Relative importance of groups of agents. A given agent i ∈ A may rely more on a certain subsets of
agents than another. This may be modeled as:
∑
k1∈S1
pik2 ≥ K
∑
k2∈S2
pik2 (B6)
where S1 ⊆ A, S2 ⊆ A and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and for some K.
Relative preference between choices. As above, a given agent may have known preferences across
choices. This may be modeled as:
(K −∆)qij2 ≤ qij1 ≤ (K +∆)qij2 (B7)
where agent i prefers choice j1 to choice j2 about K times, and ∆ is a constant that describes the
degree of uncertainty in the accuracy of the parameter K. This is especially useful when {qij}j∈C are
known up to a multiplicative constant following estimation via questionnaires and surveys (these,
in some sense, “isolate” agents from their network). Typically, this should provide |C|(|C| − 1)/2
pairs of inequality constraints per agent, or |C| − 1 equality constraints when ∆ = 0.
Decisiveness. To represent the relative reliance by an agent on his/her network:
∑
k∈A
pik ≥ K
∑
j∈C
qij or
∑
k∈A
pik ≤ K
∑
j∈C
qij (B8)
for some K.
Presence/absence of reliance on other agents (sparsity). Where it is clear or highly likely that, a
given agent i never directly adopts the choice of another agent k, one may represent this as
pik = 0. (B9)
This is particularly important because without constraints of this sort, the dimension of “real-world
problems” would become too large to be computationally tractable in practice.
Adjusting the Polyhedron so That It Is Nonempty
As a preprocessing step, to ensure that the polyhedron to be searched for a point estimate of
the model parameters is non-empty, one might solve a linear optimization problem comprising
constraints (B1)-(B5) as well as constraints of the form (B6)-(B9). The goal of doing this is to find
the “smallest” slack variables necessary for feasibility. To this end, multiple objectives are possible,
for example, one might minimize the largest ratio of ǫ+ij+ǫ
−
ij to πij . Once the foregoing optimization
problem is solved, one obtains a polyhedron described by constraints (B1)-(B5) (albeit with the ǫ·ij’s
fixed), and the same constraints of the form (B6)-(B9). Denote this polyhedron S.
S-2
Computing an Estimate for {pik}i∈A,k∈A and {q
(j)}j∈C
At this point, one may finally solve an optimization problem to maximize, over {pik}i∈A,k∈A and
{q(j)}j∈C in S, the distance to the planes defined by the inequality constraints (B6)-(B8). Should
the optimal value of this problem be 0, the constraints which are satisfied with equality for all
points of S should be replaced with equality constraints and the resulting problem solved. This
should be repeated until either no inequality constraints are left, or a strictly positive optimal value
is obtained.
In either case, the final solution provides a point estimate. However, in the latter case, one has a
point in the relative interior which may be used as a feasible starting point to solve for the analytic
center (of the relative interior).
Appendix C: More on Decisiveness
Consider an example with C = {−1, 1} and qi,j = η/2 for both j ∈ C. Suppose also that P is a
matrix with equal entries in all its off diagonal entries and zeros on its diagonal. In this case, it
is clear that the choice shares are equal. Under the simulation process in §??, each non-rejected
realization yields a “choice vector” X ∈ C |A| = {−1, 1}|A| listing the respective choices of each
agent. Obviously, E [X] = 0 since the choice shares are equal. However, one may easily verify that
lim
η↓0
E
[
XXT
]
= eeT . This occurs because it becomes increasingly unlikely (with decreasing η) that
more than one agent selects a choice without relying on others in the network.
With the above example in mind, it is clear that in regimes of low decisiveness, as quantified by
by {
∑
j∈C qij}i∈A, herding emerges. This is explored briefly in a special case.
C.1 Herding by Preferential Attachment
Consider P such that for each i ∈ A, pik1 = pik2 for all k1, k2 ∈ A (k1 6= k2 6= i). It may be deduced
that conditional on the “decisive” agents (those that selected choices from C in the first step of the
simulation process of §??), each other agent adopts the choice of some decisive agent (via a chain of
adoptions) according to a proportional preferential attachment process. (This is also known as the
Polya urn model or, more generally, a finite Polya process with “unit feedback”. See, for instance
Chung et al. (2003).)
Each decisive agent corresponds to a set of agents that ultimately adopt his/her choice via a chain
of agents. Let each such set be known as a herd. Clearly, the number of herds is a random variable
that depends on {
∑
j∈C qij}i∈A, with the expected number of herds monotonically increasing in it.
For this special case, Proposition C.1 (stated without proof) gives the expected fraction of agents
in the largest herd conditional on the number of decisive agents. The result is asymptotic due to
“edge-effects” associated with the discreteness of outcomes. However, simulation results suggest
that the limit distribution is a good approximation even for populations of agents that one might
not regard as large. Denote the maximum herd size when there are d decisive agents among a total
of |A| agents as Hmaxd (|A|).
Proposition C.1 (Expected Fraction of Agents in the Largest Herd)
lim
|A|→∞
E
[
Hmaxd (|A|)
|A|
]
=
1
d
d∑
k=1
1
k
=:M
(1)
d . (C1)
Illustrations of Proposition C.1 may be found in Figures C.1 thru C.8 along with simulated
average maximum herd sizes and quantiles obtained from simulation (for |A| ranging from 100 to
20,000). Note the similarity of the figures over the large range of |A|.
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Figure C.1: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| = 100;
10,000 samples)
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Figure C.2: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| = 250;
10,000 samples)
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Figure C.3: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| = 500;
10,000 samples)
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Figure C.4: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| =
1, 000; 10,000 samples)
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Figure C.5: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| =
2, 000; 10,000 samples)
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Figure C.6: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| =
5, 000; 10,000 samples)
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Figure C.7: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| =
10, 000; 10,000 samples)
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Figure C.8: Expected Maximum Herd Size: The Asymptotic Limit and Simulated Data (|A| =
20, 000; 10,000 samples)
To frame this result in a more classical, combinatorial context, consider finite Polya processes
with d “bins” in which the probability that the next “ball” is placed in a “bin” is proportional to
mγ where m is the number of “balls” currently in that “bin”. It is well known that when γ < 1,
the limiting fraction of “balls” in the “largest” “bin” is 1/d. When γ > 1, the limiting fraction is
1. Proposition C.1 (and its generalization, Proposition C.2) fills in a small part of the gap for the
case where γ = 1. (Note: The paper of Chung et al. (2003) includes a section containing a short
survey of known results for finite Polya processes.)
Under this stylized model, Proposition C.1 suggests that herding behavior is of concern mainly in
environments with few “decisive” agents where the largest herd can correspond to a relatively large
fraction of agents. While it would be inappropriate to draw too many conclusions from this stylized
model, however it is somewhat telling that Jeong et al. (2003) found that “measurements on four
networks, namely the science citation network, Internet, actor collaboration and science coauthor-
ship network indicate that the rate at which nodes acquire links depends on the node’s degree, offering
direct quantitative support for the presence of preferential attachment”. (Admittedly, citations and
Internet links are compatible with “choice”, while the others reflect “group formation”.)
As a point of note, the proof technique of Proposition C.1 may also be used to obtain all the
higher moments for the fraction of the total population in the largest herd (result stated without
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proof):
Proposition C.2 (Moments of the Fraction of Agents in the Largest Herd) Let
M
(m)
d := lim
|A|→∞
E
[(
Hmaxd (|A|)
|A|
)m]
.
for d ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1. The moments of the expected fraction of agents in the largest herd satisfy
M
(m)
d =
m∑
k=0
d− 1
dk
m!
(m− k)!
(m+ d− k − 2)!
(m+ d− 1)!
M
(m−k)
d−1 , (C2)
M
(m)
d =
d− 1
m+ d− 1
M
(m)
d−1 +
m
d(m+ d− 1)
M
(m−1)
d , and (C3)
M
(m)
d =
m
m+ d− 1
d∑
j=1
(d− 1)!
j!
(m+ j − 2)!
(m+ d− 2)!
M
(m−1)
j . (C4)
where M
(0)
0 := 1. In particular, M
(m)
1 := 1 and M
(0)
d := 1.
Simulations show that those limiting values are good approximations even for systems with just
thousands of agents. As such, if we further restrict ourselves to the case what each agent is decisive
with the same probability (P = 1−γ|A| ee
T ) for γ ∈ (0, 1)), one may efficiently compute approximate
expectations of (smooth) functions of the fraction of the total population in the largest herd. To
do this, one uses Proposition C.2 to obtain a truncated series of moments given that number of
decisive agents and uses an appropriate normal distribution to approximate binomial distribution
with |A| trials and parameter γ. The aforementioned normal approximation is used to sample the
number of decisive agents and the moments are used to approximate the aforementioned functions.
Appendix D: More on the Brand Ambassador Problem
The brand ambassador selection problem may be easily extended to consider situations where
brand ambassadors never exclusively recommend a choice, such as in social media settings. This is
achieved by “splitting” agents into multiple identical “sub-agents” who divide the original agents’
endowment and may be “individually” added to the set of brand ambassadors. To achieve non-
exclusive recommendation, one may disallow certain “sub-agents” from being added to the set of
brand ambassadors. Naturally, this variant admits the same approximability result.
In some problem settings, it may turn out that the “network” is revealed sequentially as a
(random) function of the “next” agent added to the set of brand ambassadors. In this case, one
may obtain the same approximation guarantee by recourse to the notions of adaptive monotonicity
and adaptive submodularity, introduced by Golovin and Krause (2011), which is a generalization
of submodularity.
In settings with strategic agents who announce a cost of turning them into brand ambassadors,
Singer (2012) showed that for “monotone submodular influence models” there exists randomized
selection rules (mechanisms) that would also ensure truthfulness in agents’ reports of their costs
(truthfulness), that selections respect budget constraints, and that outcomes are within a constant
factor of optimality in expectation. In particular, he describes an incentive compatible mechanism
for the “coverage model” wherein agents are greedily selected according to their marginal contri-
bution per unit cost. However, in contrast with the work of Sviridenko (2004), who described a
variant of the greedy selection strategy for monotone submodular maximization that produces a(
1− 1
e
)
approximation of the optimal solution given knapsack/budget constraints, the strength of
the approximation guarantees of Singer (2012) are sacrificed in favor of computational tractability
and ease of describing the mechanism.
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